Policy learning within belief systems in the financial crises of 1929 and 2007 by Rodríguez García, Orlando
C i ENC i a Pol í t i Ca Nº 15    ENERo-JUNi o  2013 
i SSN 1909-230x/PáGS. 154-181
C i ENC i a Pol í t i Ca Nº 15    ENERo-JUNi o  2013 
i SSN 1909-230x/PáGS. 154-181
 
Policy learning within belief 
systems in the financial crises 
of 1929 and 2007
oRlaNDo RoDRí GUEz GaRC í a
máster en Economía Política Global de la Universidad de  
Kassel, alemania.
orlando.rodriguez@msn.com
aprendizaje de políticas dentro de los sistemas 
de creencias en las crisis financieras de 1929 y 
2007
154
155
Policy learning w
ithin belief system
s in the financial crises of 1929 and 2007 · orlando R
odríguez G
arcía
C i ENC i a Pol í t i Ca Nº 15    ENERo-JUNi o  2013 
i SSN 1909-230x/PáGS. 154-181
Resumen
El presente artículo compara los sistemas de creencias evidenciados en las crisis 
financieras de 1929 y 2007, e indaga por el resultado en el aprendizaje de políticas. 
El texto muestra que los agentes confirmaron sus sistemas de creencias con los 
resultados favorables de sus políticas en el corto plazo. Esto los motivó a reproducir 
estas políticas, para enfrentar la incertidumbre en el largo plazo. Sin embargo, 
estas alternativas representaron decisiones infructuosas cuando las circunstancias 
cambiaron. Después del impacto de las crisis, los académicos y diseñadores de 
políticas se abstienen de modificar sus sistemas de creencias. Por lo tanto, los 
diseñadores de políticas enfrentan el riesgo de asumir una visión cortoplacista 
sin modificaciones episódicas, que evitan el análisis contextual del fenómeno 
económico, para prevenir otras crisis económicas similares.
Palabras claves: Aprendizaje de políticas, sistemas de creencias, crisis 
financieras, la gran depresión, intervención gubernamental, libre mercado, 
incertidumbre, contenidos programáticos.
abstract
This paper compares the belief systems in the financial crises of 1929 and 2007, 
and asks for the outcome of policy learning. It shows that agents confirmed their 
belief systems through the early good outcomes of their policies in the short cut. It 
encouraged them to reproduce those policies, in order to face uncertainty in the 
unforeseeable future. However, those choices represented unsuccessful decisions, 
when circumstances changed in the long-term. After the impact of the crises, 
scholars and policy makers refuse to modify their belief systems. Therefore, policy 
makers face the risk to assume a short horizon view without episodic modifications, 
which avoid the contextual analysis of economic phenomena, in order to prevent 
similar economic crunches.
Keywords: Policy learning, belief systems, financial crises, the Great 
Depression, government intervention, free-market, uncertainty, programmatic 
components.
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introduction
It is expected that deep economic dislocations lead to significant 
restructuring on core beliefs through the policy learning process. This 
is represented by the change in the arguments to build a particular 
belief system, and which lead the discussion against other ones. Policy 
learning breaks the one-side position. Indeed, the old belief system 
takes external ideas to develop a new core belief. The further govern-
ment programs move away from the old policy package to a new one. 
Policy makers foster a rational process in order to choose the best 
programmatic component. It evidences their priorities and core beliefs.
Taking into account that expectation, this article looks at the 
deep economic dislocations in 1929 and 2007. It shows that the aim 
of policy makers was threatened by overconfidence on a particular 
belief system, supported by the early outcomes in the short run. It 
avoided pertinent adjustments of programmatic components, when 
a set of events in the long run did not fit into the certainty of agents’ 
belief system.
Economics developed more sophisticated mechanisms to tackle 
the economic structure. However, they were not implemented at time 
by policymakers. There was not change into beliefs to explain those 
financial crises. Therefore, the present paper concludes there was not 
sufficient policy learning. The discussion between the two opposite core 
belief systems remains without modification. A significant restructuring 
on core beliefs in political economy has not been acquired.
The paper is oriented through a method of comparative analysis. It 
follows a descriptive method of policy suggestions and programmatic 
components in the 1929 and 2007 financial crises. It looks for the 
institutional change on belief systems. It is expected that policy makers 
take into account the historical performance of institutions, before to 
launch further policies. It is not possible to prescribe change in institu-
tions, but to analyze its historical performance in a particular period of 
time. It allows researchers and policy makers to implement a new policy 
package, in order to start an incremental change through innovation 
in institutional environment (North, 1990). Therefore, the paper looks 
at descriptive analyses and critical reviews of financial crises from 
economists and researchers, which belong to one out of two opposite 
belief systems: on the one hand, free-market, and on the other hand, 
government intervention.
The current article looks at the analysis of economic public policies 
in the financial crises of 1929 and 2007. These phenomena are read 
from the point of view of two different trends within the core belief 
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systems in the foundations of political economy. The comparison of 
public policy core beliefs and programmatic components looks for 
a pattern between them. The analysis of belief systems explains the 
objectives of decisions made by agents, in order to manage particular 
events. Further, it points out the features of the political and economic 
practices and ideas, before and during the both crises. finally, it points 
out the analysis of economic crises from the lens of different belief 
systems. The awareness of these issues helps to prevent similar eco-
nomic dislocations in the unforeseeable future.
The argument of the article is developed through four main sec-
tions. The first one introduces the formation process of belief systems. 
Actors face uncertainty, according to their experience on critical events, 
and following the principles of theoretical frameworks (Worsham, 1997; 
Bacharach, 1986). The second section provides the arguments in a 
controversy between belief systems in political economy for and against 
government intervention in markets. The third and fourth parts analyze 
two different lenses of the same episodes in the Great Depression and 
the crisis of 2007. The first interpretation (Kindleberger, 1978; Akerlof 
and Shiller, 2009) blames the lack of regulation such as the main cause 
of the economic dislocations during those periods. The second analysis 
(Rothbard, 2000 ; Friedman, 2009 ; Wallison, 2009), points out the 
excessive interference of government on the behavior of the markets, 
like the distortion of the normal business cycle which led to the both 
crises. finally, the paper associates the belief systems of each period and 
the different schools, in order to answer to what extent do agents before 
the financial crises of 1929 and 2007 share their belief systems? Did 
belief systems in 2007 follow policy learning from the 1929 financial 
crisis?
Belief systems formation
Economic and political actors respond to daily problems, according 
to their experience and knowledge about the economic and political 
world. Every time agents tend to make decisions, which respond to their 
interests. By doing so, the criteria to evaluate alternatives come from 
their beliefs on the best option. This intellectual process differentiates 
the agents’ positions in relation to particular economic policies. In this 
way, individual beliefs become concrete programs.
The economic public policies embody some ideal ways, which led 
to a mix of political and social goals and material interests. The way 
to state priorities and to harmonize needs and solutions follows a 
substructure in the mind of the actors (Worsham, 1997). By doing so, 
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John Maynard Keynes (1973) asserts that scholars and policy makers are 
deeply inﬂuenced by ideas, even when they are not aware of it.
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when 
they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is 
commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else… Soon 
or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or 
evil. (Ídem, 383)
Policy makers make mistakes not necessarily because they have evil 
interest. Rather, they choose the best option among a wide range of 
policies, according to their ideas about how to build the best possible 
world. In the same way, Socrates stated in the V century before Christ 
that a man always pursues good intentions, but he makes mistakes 
because of his ignorance. Not academic ignorance, but the moral one. 
The man moves toward the wrong orientation, because of he does not 
understand that the good one is toward the other side. For instance, 
a robber believes that the practice to steal is good, because in this 
way he would get more money. Is it good to steal? In this case, the 
answer is yes from the point of view of the robber, because he does not 
understand that the good choice is to leave the money in the hands of 
its owner. He did not develop the skills to understand the argument. 
Even the robber could learn to repeat, using his own words: “It is bad 
to steal”. However, in the practice he believes that it is good. Therefore, 
he is ignorant in the moral way. In the supra-world of the several ideas 
of good, the man chooses the option, which he thinks that represent 
the best one. However, he ignored to what extent he ignored which 
one is the best solution. That is why the Oracles of Delphos said that 
Socrates was the most wisdom man in The Ancient Athens, because at 
least he knew that he ignored. That is to say, the men, such as the policy 
makers, are exposed to be wrong, because they tend to failure within 
uncertainty.
According to his particular belief system, every agent makes 
decisions about the unforeseeable future. Different proposals emerge 
in order to face a wide range of issues within uncertainty (Bacharach, 
1986). Actors face uncertainty through their core beliefs. Belief systems 
includes several dimensions, introduced by Michael Bacharach, like the 
speech of authorities, actors expectations about the likely behavior of 
economic and political variables, the economy theories, and individual 
beliefs about the interests of other agents.
There is a close relation between the beliefs of agents and the 
development of the economic knowledge. Michael Bacharach (1986) 
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points out that a weak theory about economic variables indicates a 
deficient knowledge to tackle with economic issues. No theory could 
answer to all the possibilities of reality; however frequently some 
doctrines are followed by agents like a common-sense economics. In 
these cases, policy makers follow a model like the only solution to every 
economic problem, independent of the context, the origin of the task 
and the actors. The analysis should go toward another orientation. The 
pertinent cure from economics should depend on the features of the 
pathology inside the society. However, belief systems in economics 
represent a fortress embattled by rigid walls difficult to break, or at 
least to modify.
Belief systems are enrooted in the making decision process of 
policy makers, by an unconsciously way. David Marsh and Paul Furlong 
(2002) explain that scholars’ orientation is shaped by their ontological 
and epistemological positions, such as a skin rather than a sweater. 
Broadly speaking, first they state that the ontological position reﬂects 
the researcher point of view about if nature being exists necessarily 
with or without the knowledge about it. “The key question is whether 
there is a ‘real’ world ‘out there’ that is independent of our knowledge 
of it” (ídem, 18). There are two ontological positions: On the one hand, 
foundationalists assert that reality is in fact independent of knowledge. 
On the other hand, anti-foundationalists assume that reality is a social 
construction, related to the actors involved on it and to the interpreta-
tion of social researchers. Second, epistemology position refers to the 
researcher’s view about: “what we can know about the world and how 
we can know it” (ídem, 19). It defines how the researcher approaches to 
know the phenomenon. There are two epistemological positions: On the 
one side, foundationalists state that researchers are objective. On the 
other hand, anti-foundationalists believe that objectivity is impossible, 
because scholars are inﬂuenced by social constructions of reality. Over-
all, the opposite ontological and epistemological position determines 
the approach of scholars to every object. For instance, it determines 
the assumptions about to what extend actors are able to know the 
forces which drive the economic phenomenon. Despite the ontological 
and epistemological ‘skin’, in political economy is expected that policy 
makers modify the beliefs within their programmatic components from 
policy learning.
The structure of belief systems has two elements: policy core beliefs 
and programmatic components (Worsham, 1997). On the one hand, 
policy core beliefs belong to the larger environment. Policy core beliefs 
supports the general understanding of agents, it represents fundamental 
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policy positions. On the other, programmatic components is related to 
particular policies about current issues. Programmatic components re-
spond to transitory needs and could change when a specific project has 
finished. Therefore, policy core beliefs and programmatic components 
are interrelated. Policy core beliefs have some fundamental normative 
precepts and ideas with a substantial empirical aspect. In this way, the 
empirical evidence of belief systems is represented by the actual public 
economic programs, like regulations or distributive policy.
Unlike natural sciences like biology or chemistry, in economics and 
politics is not possible to test hypothesis in the laboratory. Instead, 
agents learn by facing directly to the social phenomena. By doing so, 
Michael Bacharach (1986) points out two kinds of learning. first, agents 
learn by reasoning. In this case, agents implement a logic process to 
link new beliefs into the rules of their knowledge. Second, agents learn 
by experience. Agents alter their belief systems through the observation 
of critical events. Therefore, policy learning occurs as the result of the 
consciousness of the gap between policy core beliefs and economic 
phenomena. The bottom of line after this crisis is a more accurately 
answer to a wide range of problems. Therefore, policy core beliefs could 
change through periods of crises. Agents revise their core beliefs during 
economic dislocation, in order to confirm it or change it.
Agents differ in their belief systems, because they take into account 
different priorities. For instance, they evaluate different aspects and 
alternatives to make decisions in the short or the long term. They have 
different measures about the limits of their knowledge, their expecta-
tions and the confidence on available information. Therefore, agents 
have relative differences in the way to approach to several economic 
solutions. In the case of policy makers, their experience provides policy 
learning in order to adjust their belief systems to new solutions. For 
instance, there was policy learning after the economic dislocation in 
1929. In this way, it is expected that agents avoid similar economic 
crises in the future.
Belief systems in political economy
The wide range of theoretical trends in economics describes how 
economic schools follow several lines of arguments, which share and 
disagree in specific economic features or in big contradictory assump-
tions about the economic phenomenon. It leads to multiple answers to 
the questions related to the ontological and epistemological positions, 
which in some trends are combined among them in complex political 
models to manage the economic reality. They include a body of several 
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choices from a dictatorial regime to the anarchist one. The historical 
discussion helps to understand how belief systems inﬂuence policy mak-
ers in order to react to the financial crises. In the same way, it analyzes 
how belief systems modify the perception of scholars to understand the 
same economic crisis. On the one hand, the lack of controls on markets, 
on the other hand the useless interference of government.
The liberalization of markets has its roots in the classical economics. 
The metaphor of the invisible hand was enunciated by Adam Smith in 
his book Theory of Moral Sentiments (1976), where he analyses the 
world of the ideas of good. This work was the basis for his economic 
theory, taking advantage of the common subjects of moral philosophy 
and economics, which share the study of human behavior.
They [the rich] are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the 
same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been 
made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its 
habitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance 
the interest of the society. (ídem, 1976:350)
This natural outcome of a nearly same distribution through the 
individual selfish interest is more explained in The Wealth of Nations 
in 1779. Individuals seek their own security, when they handle the 
industry in a particular direction. However, they are led by an invisible 
hand in order to promote an unintended aim in the society, in a more 
effective way than when individuals have the explicit intention to do 
it (Smith, 1979). In this way, Adam Smith criticized the mercantilist 
restriction to exporting crops. However, in The Wealth of Nations 
Adam Smith even accepted some rules to protect national industry. 
This was criticized by David Ricardo (1937), who stated in a stronger 
way the efficiency of free-market without any government intervention.
David Ricardo in his book The Principles of Taxation and Political 
Economy (1937) complemented the Smith’s assumptions about the 
benefits of private market and its natural equilibrium. Ricardo states 
that the restrictions to foreign trade, which seek to protect national 
economy, would lead to the opposite effect.
The injurious effects of the mercantile system have been fully 
exposed by Dr. Smith; the whole aim of that system was to raise 
the price of commodities in the home market by prohibiting foreign 
competition; but this system was no more injurious to the agricultural 
classes than to any other part of the community. By forcing capital into 
channels where it would not otherwise flow, it diminished the whole 
amount of commodities produced. (ídem, 212)
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Overall, the message from the classical school was that government 
does not have enough knowledge to control the high complexity of 
variables interaction in markets. Indeed, private actors would adjust 
themselves, according to their interest in a natural way.
The belief about the natural equilibrium in free-markets without 
government interference has been embodied by several economics 
schools. For instance, the Austrian economist Ludwig Von Misses, in 
his book published before the first World War, The Theory of Money 
and Credit, stated the useless of government rules in markets. “State 
intervention to assure to the community the necessary quantity of 
money by regulating its international movements is supererogatory” 
(Von Misses, 1953:249).
The belief of the laissez-faire within the theory of market competi-
tion found the both followers and critics. For instance, many scholars 
remarked that free-market is not enough to ensure the benefits within 
a capitalist system. They argue that free-markets can performance in 
an expected way in regular time, even though in some cases there are 
failures on markets that need the help of external interference.
The market can be mostly right, but occasionally break down. 
When the body does not function correctly, we take it to the doctor; 
when the market breaks down on occasion, we may need the medicine 
of a lender of last resort. (Kindleberger, 1978:221)
According to this belief, crises follow a pattern of boom and panic 
of markets. The government intervention should take control of booms, 
in order to prevent the deeply impact of panics.
Charles Kindleberger (1978) explains the boom phase such as an 
agents’ euphoria, after the favorable outcome of investments. “Price 
increase, giving rise to new profit opportunities and attracting still fur-
ther firms and investors. Positive feedback develops, as new investment 
led to increases in income that stimulate further investment and further 
income increases” (ídem, 17). For instance, Robert Boyer (2000) asserts 
that private actors need some rules from the government, in order to 
prevent economic dislocations. “Forms of competition necessarily imply 
the imposition by the political process of some constraints or rules to 
be enforced, merely to prevent collusion which would be detrimental to 
the rest of the society” ( 82).
The regulation theory takes some ideas from political scientists and 
economists from different trends, like John Maynard Keynes and Karl 
Polanyi, who saw a more effective outcome through the links between 
private interests and public intervention. Keynes observes the useful 
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adoption of government measures to promote a multiplier effect in 
the economy. In this point, Charles Kindleberger (1978) asserts the 
benefits of government interference to help the economy’s performance. 
“Intervention is an art, not a science. General rules that the state 
should always intervene or that it should never intervene are both 
wrong” (ídem, 5). It is expected that this complement takes advantage 
in between the both forces. “Economic theory does not prove that 
markets are always, and in any circumstances, the most efficient way 
of allocating resources. In some cases, public intervention improves 
the outcome for all economic agents” (Boyer, 2000:70). Therefore, the 
government is able to modify the economic process, when the reality of 
its performance does not follow the expectations, and it is in the risk of 
an economic dislocation.
Broadly speaking, the regulation theory recognizes the historical 
outcome of private competition. However, it asserts that the market 
needs some government intervention within critical periods. These 
scholars refuse an absolute free-market, because they do not believe 
in the efficiency of market mechanisms in every episode of society. 
Actually, they do not see practical performance of economy without 
opportune intervention of government. “Reference to the invisible 
hand was the only alternative remaining to provide a minimal 
understanding of highly complex and interdependent developments” 
(ídem, 66). Particularly, according to the regulation theory, the 
complex features in the market development avoid the equilibrium 
through natural methods. “The very maturing and sophistication 
of capitalist economies make belief in the self-equilibrating role of 
markets and their efficiency less and less realistic” (ídem, 70). finally, 
the regulation theory states that market competition needs to be 
complemented through some government intervention in critical 
cases, in order to achieve most efficient outcomes and to prevent 
systemic failures.
Overall, there are two strong positions from different belief systems 
in relation to the interference of government in the behavior of markets. 
It is expected that actors modify their beliefs after the experience of an 
economic dislocation, through a policy learning process. In this way, be-
lief systems would be closer to the economic phenomenon. According to 
Aristotle, the true is the adaptation of thought to the reality. The more 
adaptation to the economic phenomenon, the more awareness about 
the economic failures. It allows policy makers to reduce uncertainty, in 
order to prevent future economic crises, such as the Great Depression.
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1929, a source of policy learning
The Great Depression was experienced at the end of 1920s and 
during the 1930s. Europe tried to recuperate its economy after the 
first World War, there were a shift in the financial gravity from United 
Kingdom to the United States, and the strategy to return to the system 
of gold standard. The decisions of governments in relation to the 
economy were criticized by scholars afterwards, because it increased 
the effects of the crisis; whether omission or excessive intervention, like 
it is presented in the following two belief systems.
Markets ignore when it is enough
Critics of the absolute free-market argue that agents before the 
Great Depression shared belief systems supported in deregulation and 
capital ﬂows. The economy experienced a boom without control, which 
shifted to panic and crash when profits grew slower than before. The 
ﬂexible policies were supported in the early benefits of lending booms 
during 1920’s. This context describes a belief system, which belongs to 
liberalization of markets.
Paul Mattick (1981) asserts that the Great Depression proved the 
erroneous belief of natural equilibrium in free-markets. He states 
that governments followed the theory of classical economics, and they 
cannot be blamed of the deepening of the depression. “The various 
governments of the capitalist nations relied, at first, on the deﬂationary 
crisis mechanism to solve the problem and did not interfere in the 
economic process” (ídem, 126). Policy makers did not know when was 
the opportune time to intervene, in order to prevent a great depression. 
They avoided trade barriers and stimulated capital ﬂows, in order to 
achieve the expectative of the economic doctrine of liberalism, such 
as the Ricardian assumption. “The great profits which are sometimes 
made by particular merchants in foreign trade will elevate the general 
rate of profits in the country” (Ricardo, 1937:77).
The argument against the natural equilibrium of markets asserts that 
the Great Depression occurred during the upswing of the global business 
cycle, and it was in a period of expanding world trade. It was supported 
through elimination of import and export prohibitions after the World 
War I. It boosted the world manufacturing production between 1924 and 
1929 (Eichengreen, 2004). “The real cause of the depression was expan-
sion of production outside of Europe during the first World War, expan-
sion which proved excessive at 1925. In addition, there were the financial 
complications of reparations and war debts” (Kindleberger, 1978:136). By 
doing so, the economic expansion led to international debt.
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Barry Eichengreen (2004) asserts that before the Great Depression 
there was a pattern of lending booms. What is more, in 1920’s the 
United States and United Kingdom governments looked for competitive 
position of their banks, through development loans. The boom was 
associated with financial innovation. “When lending shifted to New 
York in the 1920’s similarly derived impetus from the growth of the 
Eurodollar market and the relaxation of capital controls” (ídem, 17). 
Further, the financial practices turned to the growth of liquid bond 
market. Policy makers followed the beliefs about positive effects of 
capital ﬂows in welfare. They saw the benefits of capital ﬂows in the 
short term. However, it did not remain in the long period. Therefore, 
the crisis was allowed by overconfidence on lack of regulation and 
asymmetric information in financial markets (Eichengreen, 2002). The 
higher development of banking systems implied the deep impact of the 
crisis (Eichengreen, 2004).
The classical prescription to the economy encouraged United 
Kingdom to the return to the gold standard at pre-war parity in 1925. 
After the first World War, United Kingdom emulated the proposal from 
David Ricardo, who argued the benefits of return to gold standard in 
England after Napoleon Wars. “The issue of paper money ought to be 
under some check and control; and none seems so proper for that pur-
pose as that of subjecting the issuers of paper money to the obligation of 
paying their notes either in gold coin or bullion” (Ricardo, 1937:241).
finally, the dislocated economies delayed over ten years to be 
recuperated from the Great Depression. Agents experienced policy 
learning about controls on capital and currency instability in a multi-
lateral system of free international trade (Eichengreen, 2004). From 
this point of view, pure mechanisms are insufficient to behave in the 
expected way at every moment without state intervention (Boyer, 2000). 
The policy learning gave to the government the knowledge to intervene 
the markets, in order to move the economic phenomenon toward a safer 
situation. It was stated that public spending complemented the benefits 
of private investment on production (Mattick, 1981). “A key normative 
element of the policy core since the 1930s is the belief that markets are 
destructive” (Worsham, 1997:13). That policy learning was evidenced in 
the economic policy package known like The New Deal. For instance, 
the United States government was involved such as an arbitrator, and 
it increased the role of regulators in several areas of economy. Charles 
Kindleberger (1978) asserts that the 1929 depression was so deep, 
because there was no international lender of last resort. It was expected 
that political management of economy prevent future dislocations. In 
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this way, these scholars conclude that the right performance of market 
is not always natural.
Markets are smarter than governments
Scholars like economists in the Austrian School trend argue excess 
of government intervention in the Great Depression, rather than the 
lack of it. This beliefs system asserts that the crisis did not begin in the 
upswing of the business cycle, but in the downswing of it. Government 
was impatient and decided to intervene in the economy, rather than 
wait for the natural equilibrium of markets. “If government wishes to 
alleviate, rather than aggravate, a depression, its only valid course is 
laissez-faire — to leave the economy alone. Only if there is no interfer-
ence, direct or threatened, with prices, wage rates, and business liqui-
dation will the necessary adjustment proceed with smooth dispatch” 
(Rothbard, 2000:155). Therefore, government interference turned the 
downswing of the business cycle into the Great Depression.
The Austrian School explains that the economy experiences an 
incremental change in the long run. It implies a cycle of upswings and 
downswings in the short cut, according to the needs of private actors. 
The long picture will shows economic growth, even when the short 
period evidences an economic crisis. Downswings are necessaries in 
order to follow the self-adjustment of markets, after a period of expan-
sion in the economy (ídem, 2000). Sometimes, a specific sector gets 
into crises such as part of this natural adjustment, when preferences 
change in supply and demand; for instance, when consumers substitute 
one product by another. On the one hand, entrepreneurs forecast the 
markets; on the other hand, markets change following the preferences of 
actors. Therefore, might be crisis of firms or sectors in between the natu-
ral adjustment of markets, but not general crises. Not all the individual 
firms and all the sectors make the same decisions at the same time. It 
just happens when government launches an intervention on markets, and 
it leads the private actors to the make the same decisions, that otherwise 
they would not make. It disrupts the natural process of the downswing, 
and it produces a kind of crises such as the Great Depression.
Murray Rothbard (2000) points out the disruption of the business 
cycle through the program of the president Herbert Hoover in 1920’s 
and 1930’s, which allowed the shift from a normal recession toward the 
Great Depression. Hoover decided to increase taxes, public dams, and 
government regulation of the stock markets.
Whenever government intervenes in the market, it aggravates 
rather than settles the problems it has set out to solve. This is a general 
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economic law of government intervention. It is certainly true for the 
overall Hoover depression policy. Nowhere has this law been so clearly 
illustrated as in the American farm program since. (ídem, 229)
According to Murray Rothbard (2000), Hoover’s plan against 
depression included intervention on wage rates and prices, expansion 
of credit, and increasing government spending. Therefore, the policy 
of protection to manage inﬂation affected all the economic system. 
“The bulk of the American population was injured, both as consumers 
of imports and as victims of inﬂation and poor foreign credit and later 
depression” (ídem, 140) Murray Rothbard recognizes that the economic 
plan of Hoover responded to good intentions in order to implement 
a modern economic knowledge. However, according to Rothbard, 
Hoover´s knowledge was wrong. For instance, Hoover’s policies tried to 
protect workers, and it gave priority to higher wage rates over profits. 
However, in the end, it increased the levels of unemployment.
Hoover’s tragic failure to cure the depression as a typical example 
of laissez-faire is drastically to misread the historical record. The 
Hoover rout must be set down as a failure of government planning and 
not of the free-market. (ídem, 187)
Murray Rothbard (2000) further asserts the misconception of 
governments in relation to the management of the gold standard. 
Governments sought to increase their prestige of being on the 
gold standard through interference. Actually, he states that United 
Kingdom could not implement a real full gold standard. “The duty 
of government is to leave the people free to do with the gold as 
they see fit. It is therefore its corollary duty not to inﬂate the money 
supply beyond the gold stock” (ídem, 148). Therefore, a package of 
inﬂationary policies, made by the governments through undesirable 
rules led to a loosing of gold in United Kingdom. “Great Britain 
insisted on continuing its policy of cheap money and credit expan-
sion—an insistence of the British government rather than its private 
bankers” (ídem, 153). Therefore, the British government avoided the 
natural behavior of free-markets.
Inﬂation induced by governments was followed by the president 
John Calvin Coolidge in US between 1923 and 1929. His administra-
tion made the decision to help United Kingdom and farmers through 
low discount rates. According to Rothbard (2000), the government of 
president Coolidge hided information about the expected consequences 
of his interference.
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If the people were allowed to know what had been transacted in 
their name and what penalties they were subsequently being forced 
to pay, they would rise up in their wrath. Better to keep the people in 
ignorance. This, of course, is the familiar attitude of the bureaucrat in 
power. (ídem, 158).
finally, the Austrian School argues that the Great Depression was 
a failure of government planning, rather than the consequence of a 
free-market reckless.
Hoover, from the very start of the depression, set his course 
unerringly toward the violation of all the laissez-faire canons. As a 
consequence, he left office with the economy at the depths of an 
unprecedented depression. (ídem, 186)
According to Murray Rothbard, the market would be adjusted by 
itself, and the normal crisis would be solved in less time. However, 
Hoover’s economic plan aggravated the crisis and recuperation was 
delayed 10 years until the Second World War. Therefore, from this 
belief system, laissez-faire would be the solution rather than the cause 
of the problem.
The guilt for the Great Depression must, at long last, be lifted 
from the shoulders of the free-market economy, and placed where it 
properly belongs: at the doors of politicians, bureaucrats, and the mass 
of “enlightened” economists. And in any other depression, past or 
future, the story will be the same. (ídem, 337)
 Overall, in this line, the policy learning was that the faster way 
to solve an economic dislocation is let the market to follow its natural 
cycle, rather than rule its adjustment.
Broadly speaking, followers of the invisible hand argue that the 
wrong implementation of control by policy makers allowed economic 
practices, which broke the economic equilibrium expected by liberal 
foundations. Otherwise, the natural performance of the business cycle 
would be achieved, thanks to the adjustments of private actors without 
the constriction of external and artificial rules.
Belief systems in 2007
The financial crisis of 2007 emerged from the relation between 
housing boom and financial credits. How did this link lead to an 
economic shock in 2007? The big investors invested their money in 
the profitable hedge funds, managed by brokers. Brokers analyzed the 
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financial products available in the market. finally, they decided to invest 
funds in the second market of mortgages. Mortgages companies, like 
Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac gave credits to borrowers, and sent them 
to the second market. However, debtors default the payments to banks. 
It affected the expectations of investments on mortgages in the second 
market. The profits from hedge funds were lower than the original 
forecasting. Investors asked for insurance services in order to cover the 
loose at the same time. Insurance companies were without reserves 
to respond to the massive demand. Households did not have money to 
pay mortgages, the big investors did not receive profits, and financial 
companies suffered illiquidity and debts. It was insolvency along the 
financial system.
There are two opposite belief systems to explain the chain of deci-
sions among financial agents, which led to the 2007 financial crisis. It 
is explained on the one hand, by the complex financial system without 
government controls (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). On the other, it is 
appointed the unnecessary interference and regulation on financial 
markets (Wallison, 2009 ; Friedman, 2009).
A complex financial market gets crazy without controls
Scholars that support the need of some regulation of markets, in 
order to ensure its efficiency, blame overconfidence of free-markets like 
the main cause of the subprime crisis. In this line, the belief systems 
before the 2007 financial crisis followed the principles of free-market, 
deregulation, propensity to risk and capital ﬂows. financial markets 
moved through innovation of financial instruments, which allowed 
agents to move easily along international market. By doing so, agents 
expected that economies could grow without obstacles. These assump-
tions were based on the outcomes of the biggest economies in the turn 
of century.
The argument to point out deregulation such as the origin of the 
2007 crisis is built on the effects of the deregulation euphoria (Weller 
and Sabatini, 2008). This belief system looks at the chain of policies 
to ensure ﬂexibility in markets, and a more complex financial system 
through higher risks. Some of them are the ‘Housing Development 
Act’ in 1968, where the government strengthened the mortgage-backed 
securities to encourage riskier investments in financial system; the 
‘Emergence Home finance Act’ in 1970 which introduced the role of 
the public mortgage companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in order 
to promote the secondary market for mortgages within a more complex 
financial system, but more profitable for riskier investors; the Riegle-
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Neal Act in 1994, which ended interstate banking restrictions; and 
the ‘Gramm-Leach-Billey-Act in 1999, which sought financial services 
modernization, and led to less restrictions to provide mortgages. These 
laws reveal the belief of policy makers on motivate liberalization of 
financial markets through deregulation of financial markets.
The belief system of deregulation of markets is appointed in two 
stages at the beginning of 21st Century. On the one hand, it was the 
boom of hedge funds among the biggest investors in financial markets, 
the high risk of brokers to invest the funds, and the lack of control 
from the government mortgages companies Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac. On the other hand, borrowers started to ask for mortgages, even 
low-income people, without restrictions to provide credits. At the end, 
low-income people default the payments, and the biggest investors did 
not receive the expected profits.
George Akerlof and Robert Shiller (2009) explain that govern-
ment did not prevent the crisis, when private actors behaved with 
overconfidence and reckless. The positive outcomes between 2000 
and 2005 led agents to follow the same model for a longer period of 
time. Investor decided to take higher risks. House buyers asked for 
mortgages estimated to be paid in twenty or thirty years. Citizens asked 
for more credits, and it increased the assets of banks. The financial 
market developed more products. The financial system became bigger 
and more complex. The world economy grew faster in the period from 
2001 to 2007 than in the last 30 years, and hedge funds increased from 
21 billion in 1999 to 1.223 billion in 2006 (Weller and Sabatini, 2008). 
“People began to buy housing as if this were their last can ever to buy a 
house, and speculators began to make investment in housing” (Akerlof 
and Shiller, 2009 :169). It was experienced the emergence of housing 
boom between 1995 and 2006.
The circumstances within the house market changed in the follow-
ing years. High expectations built in the short time did not wait the 
desirable twenty or thirty years. They crashed from one to another day. 
Housing speculative fever and uncontrollable mortgages transaction 
precipitated the financial crisis in 2007. Therefore, these scholars point 
out the lack of regulation of markets that led to a speculative behavior. 
However, the high expectation was followed by disappointment, panic 
and lack of confidence. “Without intervention by the government the 
economy will suffer massive swings in employment, and financial 
markets will, from time to time, fall into chaos” (ídem, 175).
Free-markets increased the pull over the lending booms. It was 
linked to the belief systems of liberalization of markets, because of 
171
Policy learning w
ithin belief system
s in the financial crises of 1929 and 2007 · orlando R
odríguez G
arcía
C i ENC i a Pol í t i Ca Nº 15    ENERo-JUNi o  2013 
i SSN 1909-230x/PáGS. 154-181
the recent outcome during the short time. Agents wanted to get more 
profits, based on a ﬂexible financial market. They took advantage 
from speculation in mortgages and from every more complex financial 
instrument. According to this line, they followed the policy core beliefs 
based on their academic knowledge of liberal doctrine and their recent 
experience.
Andrew Baker (2008) blames the lack of regulation, like the cause 
of several financial crises in the turn of century.
The overriding belief held by senior treasury officials was that 
liberalized capital markets were good for the global economy and 
overall global welfare, with the benefits believed to show up in higher 
rates of growth, wages, returns to capital and standard of living. 
(ídem, 40)
In addition, Baker remarks the lack of capital control during inter-
national transactions, because of the principle of open capital markets. 
During the globalization era a confidence market is linked to financial 
liberalization. For instance, Baker argues that policy makers before the 
Asian crisis in 1990’s followed genuine confidence on belief systems 
related to the liberalization of markets.
Neo-liberal ideas are not promoted by the Treasury simply 
because of a strategic instrumental political calculation that they are 
in US interest, but ultimately as a consequences of a basic intellectual 
faith in the efficiency of free-markets. (ídem, 41).
Andrew Baker (2008) explains that economic policies which support 
free-markets followed the idea of a superior form of economic organiza-
tion, where rational agents reacts to market distortions according to 
specific information, like a rise in prices. Without political barriers, it is 
expected that agents get benefits from liberalization of markets. Baker 
(2008) states the good intentions of US treasure officials, and their 
academic skills. According to their academic formation, they reacted 
through the core beliefs of free-markets. From their orthodox view, 
the economic policies applied by US at the end of 20th Century and at 
the beginning of 21st were the most reliable way to ensure the market 
confidence.
Baker (2008) states that agents, which made decisions based on 
classical belief systems, learned from the experience through the good 
outcomes during the recent years. In this way, agents made decisions 
in order to introduce policies, following normative liberal principles. 
By doing so, agents expected to ensure economic success. By doing so, 
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agents built a financial structure supported in complex settings, which 
took advantage of capital ﬂows. Further, classical belief systems justified 
the lack of controls from policy makers. Therefore, it allowed financial 
innovation, asymmetric information, lending booms, speculation and 
over risk on capital markets. Overall, according to this perception, 
belief systems before the 2007 crisis tended toward economic policies, 
which supported deregulation in order to strength liberalization of 
markets.
A complex regulation system pressures without knowledge
Other scholars understood the crisis of 2007 such as the con-
sequence of government interference on the natural movements of 
free-markets.
 The current financial crisis is not – as many have said – a crisis 
of capitalism. It is in fact the opposite: a demonstration that well-
intentioned government intervention in the private economy can have 
devastating consequences. (Wallison, 2009:365)
According to Peter Wallison, the 2007 crisis was caused by excessive 
interference of government, when it increased pressure on banks to re-
duce lending standards, in order to promote the access of more people 
to mortgage financing. The aim of the government was to increase home 
ownership among minority, low-income and other underserved groups.
Peter Wallison (2009) blames to the ‘Community Reinvestment Act’ 
in 1997 and the affordable-housing mission adopted by the US Congress 
in 1990, which allowed the pressure on banks to make loans, which 
otherwise they would not made it. Government intervention helped 
to inﬂate the housing bubble, and precipitated the effects on financial 
sector. “The financial crisis should thus be attributed to public policies - 
not to any ‘failure of capitalism’” (ídem, 375).
This belief system criticizes the high government intervention 
in financial markets. It increased after the ‘good intentions’ of Bill 
Clinton administration, which promoted the purchase of new house for 
every family. It decreased the restrictions in mortgages companies to 
give credits to borrowers. It gave new policies to grade prime credits 
and subprime credits. Prime credits are given to debtors with a good 
financial history, and which likely would fulfill their installments. 
Further, these prime credits are provided with low interest rate. On the 
other side, subprime financial credits are given to low-income people, 
who have a red financial history, and it is less likely they would pay 
the installments in the middle term. The new regulation lowered the 
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requirements to grade as prime credit. Therefore, some old subprime 
credits, became graded as prime credits. It sent a wrong message to 
financial agents. It leads to a distortion in the financial landscape, and 
affected the making decision process of investors and brokers. Hedge 
funds were used to purchase prime mortgages, some of them old sub-
prime credits transformed in prime credits. However, these new prime 
credits given to low-income people behaved like old subprime credits. 
Borrowers default payments, and led to financial contagion along the 
financial market from the bottom to the top. Overall, according to this 
belief system, the government intervention altered the information 
received by investors within the making decision process. The policy 
to alter the grades of prime credits confused financial agents, and 
disrupted the natural reaction of free-market. Otherwise, the banks 
would refuse credits to low-income people, and financial markets would 
behave in a less critical performance.
Jeffrey Friedman (2009), from the same line, explains the crisis in 
2007 like a toxic unintended reaction among regulatory actions, in order 
to take the control of the financial market. “The legal protection of the 
three rating firms by S.E.C. regulations issued over the course of seven 
decades interacted with the Basel rules in unexpected ways” (ídem, 
162). Therefore, too much regulation was involved in a more complex 
system, and the ignorance about its consequences led to the systemic 
failure.
The problem of the regulator and the scholar -and of the citizen of 
a social democracy - is essentially the same: There is too much infor-
mation. This is why modern societies seem ‘complex’. And it creates 
the special kind of ignorance with which modern political actors are 
plagued: Not the costliness of information but its overabundance. 
(ídem, 169)
Broadly speaking, these scholars believe that there is no omnisapi-
ent government able to know how to harmonize the complex relations in 
the performance of market. Rather, the market tends to be adjusted by 
itself.
Overall, the 2007 crisis was the consequence of incautious behavior 
of actors, which followed their belief systems through a complex 
financial system. However, who was incautious? For some scholars, like 
George Akerlof and Robert Shiller (2009), private agents in financial 
markets should behave with more prudence, and the government should 
increase controls on markets. On the other hand, Jeffrey Friedman 
(2009) and Peter Wallison (2009) state that government should refuse 
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to take the control of the free-market through more complex regulation 
and confusing information, which will send incentives to financial 
actors in the wrong orientation.
the experiences of 1929 and 2007
The comparison of the both financial crises in 1929 and 2007 
describes the most different cases with a key coincidence, which led to 
similar outcomes. They evolved from a different background because 
of the difference in the level of complexity between the financial 
structures in 1929 in relation to the sophisticated feature in 2007. The 
policymakers in the subprime financial crisis got the policy learning, 
the economics knowledge and the political experience of 78 years 
afterward. Even though, the both crises had a significant coincidence: 
the policy makers experienced overconfidence after the outcome of 
their policies in the short-term, which encouraged them to implement it 
for a longer time and taking higher risk. The circumstances of markets 
changed in the long cut and the policies did not have the early effect, 
which led to the both financial crunches.
The financial system in 2007 was more complex than the context in 
1929. On the one hand, political institutions build specific policies to 
the features of the evolutionary market. On the other hand, economics 
gave more efficient tools to understand and modify the economic 
phenomenon. Policymakers faced the 2007 financial crisis with a set of 
available institutions, through a more complex system. Just like it was 
showed above, particularly the mortgage sector experienced a sophis-
ticated market through specific policies to monitor the specialized 
market. Some of them are the Housing and Urban Development Act 
in 1968, which lined the mortgage-backed securities; the Emergency 
Home finance Act in 1970 that established the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) in order to promote the mortgage 
market; The Riegle-Neal Act in 1994 that updated the interstate laws to 
the needs of the modern structure of national banks; and the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 about the financial services modernization, 
which reinforced the role of investment banks, commercial banks and 
security companies into the market. Those samples of the new mortgage 
landscape draw a financial system in 2007 with different features to 
1929.
Policy learning moved the dynamic of system forward as well. Bob 
Jessop (Jessop and Sum, 2006) points out to what extent the regulation 
approach changed the understanding of management within the free-
market scenario. “Although the opposition between market and state is 
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a canonical feature of orthodox economics, it is fundamentally ﬂawed 
and cannot capture the complexities of advanced capitalism” (ídem, 
152). Jessop shows the emergence of mechanisms for economic and 
political coordination rather than the dichotomy in the market – state 
relationship.
Economics provided a wide field of tools to prevent crises after 
policy learning. For instance, John Maynard Keynes suggested the 
magic quadrangle which combines the goals of macroeconomic policy: 
economic (sustainable) growth, price stability, full employment and 
balance of trade. Keynes (1973) claimed the control of financial, goods, 
and labor markets. It would be adjusted by the expansion or contrac-
tion, according to the health of the economy. That system represented 
a policy learning process in 1930’s, after the 1929 financial crisis. It 
refused the impact of the widespread of free-market in employment for 
the long-term. Keynes theory was deeply developed in the demand-side 
by several economists. Particularly, Hyman Minsky went deeply in the 
financial crisis formation (Kindleberger, 1978). It highlights the preven-
tion of financial crunch. Therefore, there were tools from economics 
which would allow policymakers to prevent the crisis in 2007. However, 
the crisis occurred again. Policy makers forgot policy learning by the 
up-swing of the economy. The short-run outcomes during the booms 
erased the lection from Minsky. Further, Keynes and Minsky branch 
was criticized by Milton Friedman, Joseph Hayek and other economists, 
focused on supply-side. These were closer to the core beliefs of policy 
makers.
Therefore policy learning after the financial crises in 1929, through 
the prevention of the fragility in markets pointed out by Keynes and 
Minsky, and the debate about it with Chicago School and Austrian 
School were eclipsed by the regulation issue to manage a capitalist 
system based on free-market; again. State and market are mutually 
implicated and structurally coevolving (Jessop and Sum, 2000). The 
features of economic system combine the both institutions and market 
players. However, the debate about to what extent is the proportion of 
state and market features provided to the mixture of them, survives 
in economics and politics to implement a policy. It is the case of the 
theoretical approaches pointed out above to explain the causes of the 
both crises in 1929 and 2007.
Despite the fertile and diverse production of economics, individuals 
use to call the same theoretical references to answer different economic 
puzzle. The making decision process among policy makers in those 
critical moments before the financial crises did not give chance to 
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alternative economic tools. Rather, policy makers repeated the guide-
lines of their core belief systems. It is showed along the set of policies 
launched before the crises, and that led to the economic crunch; such 
as the mortgage acts between 1970’s and 2000’s for the liberalization of 
markets, or the intervention of government to give incentives to mort-
gage companies and householders by reducing the bank restrictions to 
loans in 1999.
Overall, there is a paradox within the making decision process. On 
the one hand, policymakers have a wide range of tools to manage the 
economy, according to the need of more or less ﬂexibility of markets, 
thanks to the evolution of economics through policy learning. On the 
other hand, individuals which embody the role of policymakers use 
to implement the same set of policies which represent their belief 
systems, according to their theoretical formation and professional 
experience. They leave alternative mechanisms offered by economics. 
This paradox emerges because of the policy makers experience showed 
them good outcomes of their core policies in the short-term along their 
performance. It gave them policy learning about their good outcome. 
Therefore, they gave the same recipe to tackle new economic problems 
with unexpected features. finally, it led to unforeseeable financial crises.
Every episode in the history of political economy is susceptible 
to read in the two opposite directions, from the lens of each belief 
system. Therefore, there is an optical threat: theory is not adapted to 
the changes of political economy phenomenon. Instead, the reality is 
adjusted through the lenses of the two core belief systems. Inside the 
same episode, where some trends look the lack of regulation, other ones 
see excessive control and government intervention.
The two beliefs were not the same in the financial crises of 1929 and 
2007, because of the dynamic of system changed (Worsham, 1997). It 
was new institutional settings like the new theories in economics. Even 
though, the political debate did not move away from the regulation 
issue to explain the economic crunch afterwards. Belief systems are so 
strong, that the both financial crises in 1929 and 2007 are explained 
like a mistake of high regulation by mainstream economics or high 
liberalization of markets by regulation theory. Therefore, the hypothesis 
of policy learning is not entirely fulfilled in these cases, even after the 
deep development by economics. Economic and political systems remain 
vulnerable to economic crises, because policy learning was insufficient, 
such as it is stated in the both views of the crises described above.
Despite the differences, the both understandings about the crises 
share a common assumption: before economic crises, agents made 
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 decisions based on genuine beliefs about the more accurately way to 
tackle economic problems. Therefore, policy makers behaved on the 
basis of their academic knowledge on a particular belief system.
A common belief before the Great Depression and the 2007 crisis, 
within the opposite belief systems, is that economic environment 
would not change in the short cut. On the one hand, the regulation 
theory asserts that if free-market was unable to ensure the natural 
equilibrium was due to overconfidence, on the basis of the outcomes 
in the short term. In this hypothesis, agents believed that they had 
excessive resources in the long term. These beliefs encouraged them 
to assume higher risks in the unforeseeable future. On the other hand, 
free markets theory stated that if the government intervened too soon 
with wrong policies, was because it believed that otherwise the critical 
situation would remain in a long time, and the business cycle would not 
change in the short period.
Overall, economic and political actors evaluate uncertainty in 
the short term on the basis of conjectural episodes. The economic 
environment before and during the Great Depression and the 2007 
crisis strengthened the belief systems of agents; against or for govern-
ment interference on markets. The favorable or negative results in the 
short term led agents to confirm their beliefs on capital ﬂows. In this 
way, uncertainty of financial markets was assumed by agents with the 
risk of absence or excessive public intervention. In the both analyses 
policymakers made decisions according to their belief systems, which 
gave priority to the short cut, over the longer one.
Broadly speaking, there were several different settings between 
the economic environment before the Great Depression and before 
the financial crisis of 2007. Economics development gave sophisticated 
tools to policymakers to evolve within a more complex system. However, 
policymakers leave these tools and used the economic mechanisms 
prescribed by their core beliefs. Therefore, policy learning was not 
effective in this case, or lessons were forgotten; a man only knows what 
he remembers. The challenge of policy makers is to modify the ideal 
view, in order to apply the whole picture of economics, according to the 
different contexts.
Conclusion
The economic dislocation of 1929 led to contextual reforms. There 
was a more complex system in 2007 with more elaborated mechanisms 
to manage the economy. However, these mechanisms are oriented to 
increase or reduce government intervention in markets. These are the 
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two general positions of the two belief systems. Whether regulation or 
free-market, remain like the same old and current discussion. This is a 
common issue in 1929 and 2007. Overall, policy learning was used by 
rulers in order to solve the emergency problem, rather than structural 
transformations to prevent financial crises in the unforeseeable future. 
Regulation theory and the fragility of market hypothesis, from Keynes 
and Minsky, are used today. However the aim of their implementation 
is adapted by policymakers, according to the priorities of their belief 
systems. It is revealed through the explanation of financial crises in 
1929 and 2007 above. Otherwise, the arguments inside the debate 
between the two opposite belief systems would be different.
The controversy about the causes of the Great Depression of 1929, 
and the subprime financial crisis in 2007 shows how is possible to 
understand the same economic episode such as two opposite realities. It 
warns about the risk to assume belief systems on political economy such 
as a dogmatic view, which is inappropriate for the volatile economic 
phenomenon. Nor two economic dislocations with the deeply effects of 
the Great Depression and the 2007 crisis could changed the assump-
tions of actors.
It alerts about the real constriction process and the policy learning 
after the economic crunch. Otherwise, it threats the economy to be 
exposed to further financial crises with similar conditions. The society 
is always exposed to financial crises. However, without policy learning 
the economy is more vulnerable. Therefore, the deepness of belief 
systems highlights the making policies process and helps to face the 
dark uncertainty. It forecasts an unforeseeable future. Even though, it 
threats to blind the understanding of economic phenomena if a short 
horizon view avoids the policy learning.
Before and during the Great Depression and the crisis of 2007 
agents did not take into account the borders of the economic assump-
tions. Agents had overconfidence on their policy core beliefs. They 
focused on the outcomes of early episodes. finally, policy makers were 
unsuccessful to forecast alternatives and risks in the long term.
Uncertainty is implicit in the effectiveness of the policymaker 
decisions. Agents are exposed to live in crises every time, and the 
crises have always been in the economy (Eichengreen, 2002). Nor 
economic doctrine is exempt of failures, neither fix in every situation. 
Even though, the historical comparison about the settings among 
economic crises helps agents to make less likely that an economic 
shock with similar features occur again. Policy learning should be 
reinforced among economic agents to prevent old mistakes. It avoids 
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that the core belief systems turns into a fixed principle, without an 
historical perception of every particular context, which is expected in 
policy makers.
It is understandable the barriers among the economic and political 
schools. They grow like parallel lines along the history, through the 
events which involve the social dynamics. Therefore, the theoretical 
lenses are reinforced by researchers within the foundations of political 
economy. These institutions are embodied just like a ‘skin’ (Marsh 
and Furlong, 2002). Even though, policy makers should not accept the 
constriction of those theoretical borders. Unlike the scholars, policy 
makers should develop the skills to analyze the economic and political 
context, in order to ensure the adaptation of the most pertinent theory 
to the problem. Even more, policy makers and governments should 
combine the suggestions from scholars, rather than launch a policy 
package based on the cold theory, such as a blue print. Otherwise, the 
policy package will not fit into the reality.
Economics provides a large and wide range of alternatives to use 
them in policy formation. However, policymakers focus on a short-room 
of choices. It is because of the lack of time to make decisions, and the 
bunch of features within every time more complex financial system. 
These phenomena avoid the historical comparison and the descriptive 
analyses during the making decision process. It is difficult to launch a 
theory during a hot topic. Rather, economics analyzes the closer early 
events. The emergency pushes policymakers to take advantage of closer 
economic and political tools; and they are the institutions which repre-
sent the programmatic components of their belief systems. Therefore, 
they repeat a prescription.
The economic and political environment during the both financial 
crises in 1929 and 2007 was different, because economics evolved and 
provided new mechanisms to policymakers. Even though, the new 
mechanisms are used by policymakers to promote or refuse government 
intervention. The descriptive analysis along the crises shows the risk on 
overconfidence in one of those belief systems. Instead, policy learning 
should be acquired through the dialogue between scholars and policy 
makers, in order to exchange ideas within different belief systems. 
first, it would lead to significant changes in the argument within the 
discussion. Second, it would allow stronger policies, in order to prevent 
further economic dislocations. It is not enough the development of 
economic mechanisms, if policymakers do not link them to their belief 
systems.
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